Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
5-2016

Vaccines and Airline Travel: A Federal Role to Protect the Public
Health
Christopher Robertson
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher Robertson, Vaccines and Airline Travel: A Federal Role to Protect the Public Health, 42
American Journal of Law & Medicine 543 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/968

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

American Journal of Law & Medicine, 42 (2016): 543-571
American Society of Law & Medical Ethics, © 2016 The Author(s)
Boston University School of Law
DOI: 10.1177/0098858816658279

VACCINES AND AIRLINE TRAVEL:
A FEDERAL ROLE TO PROTECT THE
PUBLIC HEALTH
Christopher T. Robertson†

This Article explores two ways in which airline travel is an important vector for
the spread of infectious disease, and argues that airlines have market-based and
liability-based reasons to require that passengers be vaccinated. Going further, the
Article explores whether the federal government has the legal and constitutional
authority—especially under the Commerce Clause—to encourage or mandate that
airlines implement such a vaccine screen. By disrupting the spread of disease at key
network nodes where individuals interact and then connect with other geographic
regions, and by creating another incentive for adult vaccination, an airline vaccine
screen could be an effective and legally viable tool for the protection of public health.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

For a wide range of highly contagious and dangerous diseases, the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) has approved safe and effective vaccines, which the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) now routinely recommends.1 With the
eradication of smallpox worldwide in 1977, the eradication of polio in the United
States in 1979, and the 100,000-fold reduction in the prevalence of diseases like
diphtheria, measles, mumps, and pertussis, the success of vaccines cannot be
disputed.2
However, the rates of vaccination have been insufficient to eradicate some
diseases.3 “Approximately 42,000 adults and 300 children in the United States die each
year from vaccine-preventable diseases.”4 On the horizon are new vaccinations, which
may address avian flu, H5N1 influenza, H1N1 influenza, norovirus, Ebola, and
tuberculosis.5 Moreover, it will soon be possible to invent a new vaccine to fight a
disease outbreak as it is happening.6
For all these diseases, the solution to morbidity and mortality is not merely
technological—it depends on human behavior. Without high levels of vaccination,
these infectious diseases will remain a significant threat.
In the American tradition of federalism, state and local governments have
exercised the plenary “police power,” which includes the primary responsibility to
secure the public health and, in particular, to fight infectious diseases.7 Accordingly,
much of the legislative action and litigation around vaccines has focused on state
mandates to vaccinate children as a prerequisite for their attendance at schools. 8 These
state mandates vary widely in the ease by which parents may exempt their children
1
The recommended vaccines include hepatitis A & B, rotavirus, tetanus, acelluar pertussis,
haemophillus influenzae, pneumococcal conjugate, polysaccharide, and 13-valent conjugate, poliovirus,
influenza, measles, mumps, rubella, varicella, human papilloma virus, meningococcal disease, and zoster.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
[CDC],
Immunization
Schedules,
CTRS.
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/easy-to-read/index.html [http://perma.cc/2M3J-ALYN] (last updated
Jan.
26,
2016);
see
also
Vaccine
Information
Statements
(VIS),
CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/index.html [http://perma.cc/E2FN-4ZWE] (last updated Aug. 7, 2015)
(listing multi and routine vaccinations).
2
See generally Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health
Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, 262-84 (Richard A. Goodman et al.
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2003).
3
Id. at 266 (showing vaccination coverage for a range of diseases, ranging from 94% to as low as
73%).
4
See Off. Of Disease Prevention & Promotion, Immunization and Infectious Disease,
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/immunization-andHEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV,
infectious-diseases?topicid=23 [http://perma.cc/7PEA-WGDL] (last updated Mar. 25, 2016).
5
See PhRMA, VACCINES, A REPORT ON THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF DISEASE THROUGH
VACCINES, MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT (2013), http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Vaccines_2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UX9Z-Q86Q].
6
Similarly, during the Ebola outbreak of 2014-15, Ebola vaccines were being developed and tested on
a fast track. See Ebola: The Race for Drugs and Vaccines, BBC (Mar. 27, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-28663217 [http://perma.cc/Y42Y-VWBJ].
7
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11 (1905) (“The police power of a State embraces such
reasonable regulations . . . established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and
safety.”).
8
See generally Malone & Hinman, supra, note 2, at 269-73.
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and, consequently, the rates of vaccination and the risk of contagion differ across the
United States. Even more, these mandates have no direct effect on the vaccination
rates of adults and do little to address the movement of unvaccinated individuals across
state or international borders.
Adult vaccination has become increasingly important. 9 In the near future, when a
new vaccine is quickly developed to respond to a specific outbreak of a more exotic
disease, adult vaccination may be essential. It may not be sufficient to rely on school
vaccinations and the smattering of adult vaccination programs, such as those for
healthcare workers. Nor will an optimal adult vaccination strategy be random. It will
instead follow the same human network of interactions that spread disease, targeting
nodes in which a vaccination may have the greatest disruption of the transmission of
disease.10
Airports and airlines are arguably one of the most important nodes. On average,
Americans take 2.1 airline trips each year.11 The United States airlines move
approximately two million people every day. 12 If unvaccinated, these travelers are
more likely to carry infectious diseases with them. This problem can be viewed as one
of externalities, flowing across jurisdictional borders: a state’s sovereign prerogative to
have robust vaccination laws that protect its residents is undermined if unvaccinated
individuals from other states cross its borders daily. 13 Because vaccines can only
provide imperfect protection to those who receive them, and some individuals are
unable to be vaccinated at all (due to other medical problems), those who choose to be
unvaccinated pose a public health threat.14
Leading voices in public health law have warned about cramped legal conceptions
of federalism, which may undermine the government’s ability to protect its citizens. 15
Of particular concern is NFIB v. Sebelius, a recent United States Supreme Court
9
See Adult Vaccination: An Important Step in Protecting Your Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/vaccineschronicconditions/ [http://perma.cc/4HBD-ZCHC]
(last updated Sept. 23, 2015) (recommending adult vaccinations for seasonal flu every year, Td vaccine
every ten years to protect against tetanus or Tdap vaccine once to protect against tetanus and diphtheria plus
pertussis (whooping cough), and additional vaccines depending on age and lifestyle, including those for
shingles, human papillomavirus, pneumococcal disease, meningococcal disease, hepatitis A and B,
chickenpox (varicella), and measles, mumps, and rubella).
10
See generally Lazaros K. Gallos et al., Improving Immunization Strategies, E 75 PHYSICAL REVIEW
045104-1 (2007). For an example of network analysis being applied to vaccination policy, see Marcel
Salathé et al., A high-resolution human contact network for infectious disease transmission, 107 PNAS
22020 (2010), http://www.pnas.org/content/107/51/22020.full.
11
Airlines, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1579/airlines.aspx [http://perma.cc/Q5KQ-LFWZ]
(last visited Feb. 29, 2016); see also 4 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OMNISTATS: 2005 OMNIBUS SURVEY
RESULTS 2 (2005), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/omnistats/
volume_04_issue_01/pdf/entire.pdf [http://perma.cc/7VJC-QAQJ] (finding that 42% of Americans surveyed
flew in the prior twelve months).
12
AIRLINES FOR AMERICA, http://airlines.org/industry/#safety [http://perma.cc/LR29-SAC3].
13
The influx of unvaccinated individuals would erode herd immunity, which requires “sufficient
immunization coverage” to protect the population as a whole. See PHRMA, supra note 5, at 4.
14
Malone & Hinman, supra, note 2, at 262-63 (discussing vaccination as a “tragedy of the commons”
problem); id. at 264 (“When a sufficiently large proportion of individuals in a community is immunized,
those persons serve as a protective barrier against the likelihood of transmission of the disease in the
community, thus indirectly protecting those who are not immunized and those who received vaccine but are
not protected (vaccine failures).”).
15
See e.g., Mark A. Hall, Constitutional Mortality: Precedential Effects of Striking the Individual
Mandate, 75 L. & CONT. PROBS. 107 (limiting by constitutional doctrine is a “frightening prospect” because
“this very power might someday be absolutely essential to saving a million or more lives, based on solid
public health science, in the event of a catastrophic public health emergency”); Wendy E. Parmet, After
September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201 (2002) (“Dogmatic
and rigid visions of federalism can imperil the public health whether the threat is natural or manmade.”).
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decision. The Court held that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
does not support a congressional mandate requiring individuals to purchase health
insurance.16 Some have argued that this decision, and the larger conception of
federalism it represents, erodes the constitutionality of core public health functions of
the federal government.17 A vaccination mandate, tracking the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, may reinvigorate Commerce Clause doctrine
for public health.
This Article is the first scholarly assessment of three issues: (1) whether airline
travel is itself an important vector for the spread of infectious disease; (2) if so,
whether airlines have market-based and liability-based reasons to require that
passengers be vaccinated; and, (3) whether the federal government has the legal and
constitutional authority to either encourage or mandate that airlines do so. The
scientific literature suggests that by disrupting the spread of disease at key network
nodes where individuals interact with each other and then connect with other
geographic regions, a vaccine screen could be an effective tool for the protection of
public health.18 The legal analysis suggests that a vaccine screen could be a legally
viable tool for the protection of public health, falling squarely within the authority of
the federal government.
Of course, vaccinations are not our only tool to address the problem of air travel
and infectious disease.19 In particular, the CDC maintains a “Do Not Board” list, which
prohibits certain individuals from flying domestically or internationally if they have a
communicable disease that presents a public health risk. 20 A primary limitation of such
policies is that they are only effective for patients that have become symptomatic and
have received a diagnosis that was passed on to the CDC for a decision about whether
to list the person. For contagious but asymptomatic people, or symptomatic people
who have not yet received a diagnosis, the Do Not Board list is ineffective. Another
possibility is to use body scanning technologies or simple contact thermometers to
attempt to identify infected persons who may have higher body temperatures, but this
strategy also has practical limitations, raising many false positives and false
negatives.21

16
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also Wendy Parmet, The
Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 401, 406 (2011) (arguing
that “infectious disease controls, including vaccine mandates, may offer the strongest case for public health
mandates”).
17
See, e.g., Arjun K. Jaikumar, Note, Red Flags in Federal Quarantine: The Questionable
Constitutionality of Federal Quarantine After NFIB v. Sebelius, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 680 (2014)
(arguing that NFIB “may render the federal quarantine power unconstitutional”).
18
See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
19
Yvonne L. Huizer et al., Usefulness and Applicability of Infectious Disease Control Measures in Air
Travel: A Review, 13 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE 19, 19 (2015) (reviewing various other tools,
including hygiene measures, exit and entry screening, and providing information to travelers).
20
See CDC, Federal Register Notice: Criteria for Requesting Federal Travel Restrictions for Public
Health Purposes, Including for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, 80 Fed. Reg. 16400 (Mar. 27, 2015); see also
CDC, Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes — United States, June 200 — May 2008,
57 MMWR WEEKLY 1009 (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5737a1.htm
[http://perma.cc/GKV9-7Z5R] (describing a one-year period in which the “CDC received requests to place
42 persons on the DNB [Do Not Board] list,” leading to 33 being actually added, all of whom were thought
to have infectious pulmonary TB).
21
See Patricia C. Priest et al., Thermal Image Scanning for Influenza Border Screening: Results of an
Airport Screening Study, 6 PLOS ONE e14490, e14490 (2011) (“Our findings therefore suggest that ITIS
[infrared thermal image scanners] is unlikely to be effective for entry screening of travellers [sic] to detect
influenza infection with the intention of preventing entry of the virus into a country.”); Jessica Glenza,
Ebola: Are Thermal Scanners Effective Prevention Tools or Just a Placebo?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2014),
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For the purposes of this initial foray into the question, let us remain agnostic about
the particular vaccines that would be included in such a screening policy (whether for
measles, influenza, or Ebola), the logistics of implementing such a screen (including
the documentation required, ranging from documented immune response to a vaccine
registry to a simple affirmation under penalty of perjury), and the scope and
procedures for any potential exemptions (medical, religious, or philosophical). These
variations will be important practically, politically, and legally, but a more general
analysis is useful to frame the question.
II. AIRLINE TRAVEL AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE
Consider three mechanisms by which air travel may affect the spread of infectious
disease. First, passenger-to-passenger transmission by contact (i.e., touching,
coughing, sneezing, etc.) is increased during air travel. Second, regardless of what
happens between passengers on the airplane, the air travel of infected passengers is an
extremely efficient mechanism for rapidly distributing a disease across state borders
and worldwide. This Article proposes a third, novel mechanism for air travel to reduce
the spread of infectious disease. If airline travel were the predicate for a vaccination
mandate, it could serve as an important incentive for people to get vaccinated, thereby
creating spillover benefits beyond the domain of air travel.
A. PASSENGER-TO-PASSENGER TRANSMISSION
The popular media portrays airline travel as if it were a journey into an
apocalypse, with disease at every turn. One headline reads: Horrific Hygiene On
Flights Revealed: Poo On Tray Tables, Urine On Seats And 80 Million Bacteria
Living On Your Suitcase.22 CNN reports that some tray tables are infected with MRSA
(Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus) at five times the rate of New York
subway poles, and warned about the airplane “lavatory as a major danger area for the
spread of disease during the H1N1 flu and SARS epidemics.” 23 Mass media often cites
survey data, which suggests that flying on an airline dramatically increases—by over
100 times—the chances that an individual will be infected with any of the roughly 200
viruses known to produce the common cold.24
The scientific literature is more sober and relatively undeveloped, but it leaves
grounds for concern.25 Means of microorganism transmission can be organized into
four main categories: contact, airborne, common vehicle, and vector borne. 26 Contact
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/ebola-prevention-thermal-scanner-effective-placebo
[http://perma.cc/2MKV-DRXN].
22
Natasha Hinde, Horrific Hygiene On Flights Revealed: Poo On Tray Tables, Urine On Seats and 80
Million Bacteria Living On Your Suitcase, HUFFINGTON POST UK (May 18, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/05/18/hygiene-on-flights-revealed-poo-tray-tables-bacteriasuitcases_n_7304226.html [http://perma.cc/88ZN-ET4C].
23
Douglas Wright, 6 Places Germs Breed in a Plane, BUDGET TRAVEL (Dec. 22, 2010, 8:00 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/12/22/bt.germs.breed.on.plane/ [http://perma.cc/7TZD-TBMF].
24
See Hinde, supra note 22 (referencing, but not citing, Martin Hocking & Harold Foster, Common
Cold Transmission in Commercial Aircraft: Industry and Passenger Implications, 3 J. ENV’T HEALTH RES.
7 (2004)).
25
Scholars have only in recent years turned their attention away from indoor chemical exposure and
towards indoor air quality in terms of the “microbiomes of built environments.” See Richard L. Corsi et al.,
Microbiomes of Built Environments: 2011 Symposium Highlights and Workgroup Recommendations, 22
INDOOR AIR 171, 172 (2012).
26
Alexandra Mangili & Mark A. Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious Diseases During Commercial
Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989, 990 (2005).
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transmission includes both direct and indirect body-to-body contact, as well as
transmission by large droplets spread by an infected person sneezing, coughing, or
talking.27 Of concern to air travelers are those diseases that are airborne and spread by
contact, such as diphtheria, pertussis, pneumococcal disease, various forms of
influenza, poliovirus, measles, mumps, rubella, varicella, tuberculosis, meningococcal
disease, SARS, smallpox, and Ebola.28 Diseases with fecal-oral transmission can also
be of concern to air travelers, but this is more likely to occur as the result of airlineassociated spread through food served on board.29
Airlines recycle about fifty percent of the cabin air, which would seem to be an
obvious vector for disease delivery. 30 However, airlines usually filter and deliver the
air vertically, from the ceiling of the cabin, drawing it downward and out, before
filtering it and mixing it with fresh air.31 Thus, the scientific literature suggests that
when the ventilation system is working properly, air quality probably does not
contribute significantly to the passenger-to-passenger transmission of infectious
diseases.32 Nonetheless, “[t]ransmission becomes widespread within all sections of the
passenger cabin when the ventilation system is nonoperational, as shown by an
influenza outbreak when passengers were kept aboard a grounded aircraft with an
inoperative ventilation system.”33 Scientists have also expressed worry that the low
levels of humidity aboard an aircraft may dry out the passengers’ mucous membranes,
which undermines the body’s natural ability to capture and destroy viruses and
bacteria.34
Transmission of diseases spread by contact—which includes large respiratory
droplets from sneezing, coughing, or talking—is more worrisome.35 Tuberculosis is
the most studied disease for spread aboard an aircraft; documented cases include a
passenger traveling between three American cities and infecting the skin of four of
fifteen fellow passengers but not leading to any cases of active disease.36
The greatest “risk of disease transmission is associated with a flight time of more
than 8 [hours] and sitting within two rows of the index passenger.” 37 There have been
reports, however, of diseases spreading more extensively. Measles infections, for
27

Id. It is worth noting that not all the literature uses “airborne” in such a limiting manner, often using
it to include droplet contact. E.g., L. Morawska, Droplet Fate in Indoor Environments, or Can We Prevent
the Spread of Infection?, 16 INDOOR AIR 335, 335 (describing relation between droplet particle size and
airborne travel). This terminology was likely used because it allowed for a clearer distinction between airbased transmission and transmission relatively independent of air quality.
28
See EUR. CTR. FOR DISEASE & CONTROL, TECHNICAL REPORT: RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASES TRANSMITTED ON AIRCRAFT 11 (2009) (selecting diseases prone to airplane
transmission for study); see generally CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ [http://perma.cc/T4AF-Z7SL] (providing
information regarding disease transmission, minimization and prevention).
29
E.g., J. Eberhart-Phillips et al., An Outbreak of Cholera From Food Served on an International
Aircraft, 116 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 9 (1996).
30
But see Jessica Nutik Zitter et al., Aircraft Cabin Air Recirculation and Symptoms of the Common
Cold, 288 JAMA 483, 486 (2002) (finding no greater risk between flights using 100% recycled air versus
50% recycled air).
31
K. Leder & D. Newman, Respiratory Infections During Air Travel, 35 INTERNAL MED. J. 50, 51
(2005).
32
See generally id.; Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26.
33
Mangili & Gendreau supra note 26, at 991.
34
See Martin B. Hocking & Harold D. Foster, Common Cold Transmission in Commercial Aircraft:
Industry and Passenger Implications, 3 J. ENVTL. HEALTH RES. (discussing this problem),
http://www.cieh.org/jehr/jehr3.aspx?id=11412 [http://perma.cc/C6DG-393N].
35
See Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26, at 992 (discussing “the real potential for rapid spread made
possible by the volume and speed of air travel”).
36
Id. at 991.
37
Id. at 992.
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instance, have been shown to spread to patients as far as sixteen rows away.38 In
another measles outbreak, an infected patient appeared to have infected another person
flying on the same aircraft, as well as five other people who had merely “visited at
least one common departure gate.”39 On the other hand, over the course of a seven
hour flight from Japan to Hawaii, a passenger with measles caused zero infections in
336 exposed passengers, presumably because the vast majority were immunized. 40
There have also been various examples of transmission of SARS onboard an
aircraft.41 Physical proximity to the infected person during the flight was clearly
correlated to risk of transmission.42 In one example, a flight attendant was infected
after interacting with and touching the tray and food of an infected person. 43 In another
case, one infected person on a flight of 119 people was associated with potential
transmission to twenty-two fellow passengers.44
Norovirus was also probably transmitted passenger-to-passenger on an airplane,
but by a different mechanism: contamination of the restrooms.45 Due to the specific
epidemiology of norovirus, and because vomiting was contained to the restrooms, it is
unlikely that airborne droplets were the cause of transmission. 46 Interestingly, all
passengers suspected of norovirus infection reported that the restrooms were clean. 47
This suggests that maintenance for the prevention of disease transmission requires
more than apparent cleanliness.
The flu has similarly been documented to spread aboard airline flights. A 1972
outbreak of influenza A/Texas strain on a plane, where passengers were kept aboard
for three hours without an operable ventilation system, “resulted in 72% of all
passengers about the airline contracting influenza within [three days].”48 The illness
then spread to twenty percent of their family members within two weeks. 49 Other cases
of influenza contamination on airplanes have involved patients seated as far as five
rows away from the patient who brought the disease on board.50
Finally, in addition to the accidental spread of disease person-to-person, there are
real concerns that airline flights could be an efficient way to distribute bioterrorism
agents among hundreds of people in very close vicinity. Smallpox is particularly
worrisome in this regard. In one outbreak in Sweden the spread of smallpox was linked
to an in-transit exposure that led to "24 secondary cases and four deaths." 51
In short, although the person-to-person spread of disease is not peculiar to airline
travel, this context intensifies this risk factor. There are few other instances in modern
social life where an individual person is in such closely proximity to strangers for such
an extended period of time while eating, drinking, and using the restroom. On the other
38

Frank H. Beard et al., Contact Tracing of In-Flight Measles Exposures: Lessons From an Outbreak
Investigation and Case Series, Australia, 2010, 2 W. PAC. SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE J. 1, 6 (2011).
39
Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26, at 993.
40
Id.; Pauli N. Amornkul et al., Low Risk of Measles Transmission After Exposure on an International
Airline Flight, 189 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES S81, S83 (2004).
41
Leder & Newman, supra note 31, at 53.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Sonja J. Olsen et al., Transmission of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome on Aircraft, 349 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2416, 2416 (2003).
45
Marc-Alain Widdowson et al., Probable Transmission of Norovirus on an Airplane, 293 JAMA
1859, 1859-60 (2005).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1860.
48
Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26, at 992.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 993.
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hand, with vaccination, widespread immunity to a disease will limit its spread, even in
these close quarters.52
B. THE FLIGHT AS A MEANS OF SPREADING DISEASE ACROSS STATE LINES
“Perhaps the greatest concern for global health . . . is the ability of a person with a
contagious illness to travel to virtually any part of the world within 24 [hours].” 53 After
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ban on airline travel and the subsequent
depression of the air travel market provided a natural experiment that demonstrated
how air travel contributed to the rate at which a disease spreads across the country. 54
We now know that the volume of travel is directly related to the rate at which
influenza viruses spread within the United States.55
There are documented cases of measles being spread around the country in this
way. For example, in 1982 a young naval officer from San Diego acquired the disease
from a two-year-old child there, and then traveled to Washington State, where he then
infected nine others.56 Only one of these individuals met him face-to-face; the others
were infected because they were on the same flight or in the same parts of the airport. 57
More recently, a single outbreak of measles at Disneyland was then spread across the
country by travelers, creating 189 cases, spread across twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia.58
“The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),” which caused 774 deaths,
“spread rapidly around the world, largely because persons infected with the SARSassociated coronavirus (“SARS-CoV”) traveled on aircraft to distant cities.”59 As the
CDC explains in its retrospective, “SARS, for the United States, was a travelassociated illness.”60
On an international scale, the spread of H1N1 has been correlated to the volume
of international flights to and from a destination.61 The implication of this study is that
commercial airports can be mapped and the connections can be used as a means of
limiting the spread of infectious diseases in the future.62 Another study, also looking at
52

See Amornkul et al., supra note 40, at S81.
Andrew T. Pavia, Germs on a Plane: Aircraft, International Travel, and the Global Spread of
Disease, 195 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 621, 621 (2007).
54
John S. Brownstein et al., Empirical Evidence for the Effect of Airline Travel on Inter-Regional
Influenza Spread in the United States, 3 PLOS MED. 1826, 1826 (2006).
55
Id. (“We found that domestic airline travel volume . . . predicts the rate of influenza spread.”).
56
CDC, Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Interstate Importation of Measles Following Transmission
in an Airport--California, Washington, 1982, 32 MMWR WEEKLY 215 (Apr. 29, 1983),
http://www.fasthealth.com/goto.php?url=www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/00000070.htm [http://perma.cc/GC3V-785T].
57
Id.
58
Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html
[http://perma.cc/5FL4-F4CG] (last updated Mar. 8, 2016) (“In 2015, 189 people from 24 states and the
District of Columbia were reported to have measles.”).
59
Olsen et al., supra note 44, at 2416.
60
Remembering SARS: A Deadly Puzzle and the Efforts to Solve It, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/about/history/sars/feature.htm [http://perma.cc/3XN6-P3YA] (last updated Apr. 26,
2013).
61
Kamran Khan et al., Spread of Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Via Global Airline Transportation,
361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 212, 213 (2009) (“We then compared the international destinations of travelers
departing from Mexico with confirmed H1N1 importations associated with travel to Mexico, and we found a
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H1N1, reached a similar conclusion: the volume of international traffic of a United
States airport can be used to predict the United States arrival time of a disease based
on the disease’s point of origin. 63
Similarly, Ebola was spread from West Africa and brought to and around the
United States by airline travel, where the first patient then infected two healthcare
workers.64 One of those healthcare workers then traveled on a domestic airline to Ohio,
where she was diagnosed.65 No transmission of the disease to fellow passengers was
documented.66
Overall, then, even if there was no risk of passenger-to-passenger spreading of
disease on the airline, there are important concerns that airlines efficiently move
passengers from one geographic region, where there may be an outbreak, to another.
Unvaccinated passengers are more likely to be so infected.
C. FLYING AS AN INCENTIVE FOR VACCINATION
The foregoing discussion has shown that airline travel is an important way for a
contagion to quickly spread through contemporary society. Aside from blunting those
causal mechanisms for the spread of disease, a vaccination policy focused on airline
travel could have secondary benefits for public health generally, since such a mandate
may cause more individuals to become vaccinated overall. On the margin, these higher
rates of vaccination will benefit public health in all the other areas where individuals
may spread contagion, including trains, subways, healthcare settings, restaurants,
sporting events, and workplaces.
Virtually all Americans will want to fly at some point during their lives, and most
Americans want to fly every year.67 Indeed, as of 2003, only eighteen percent of
survey respondents reported that they have never flown, and many of that small
percentage were younger individuals who simply have not yet had the opportunity to
fly.68 Interestingly, families who refuse to vaccinate their children are also more likely
to have higher incomes and higher levels of education,69 and this is the profile of most
airline travelers.70
Some individuals will receive medical exemptions to any vaccine mandate, and a
mandate keyed to airline travel may also recognize some religious or philosophical
exemptions, even though there is no constitutional requirement to do so. The
remaining non-exempt individuals will likely number in the millions, depending on
63
Grace M. Hwang et al., A Model-Based Tool to Predict the Propagation of Infectious Disease Via
Airports, 10 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE 32 (2012).
64
Wendy M. Chung et al., Active Tracing and Monitoring of Contacts Associated With the First
Cluster of Ebola in the United States, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 164, 164 (2015); see generally C.
Poletto et al., Assessing the Impact of Travel Restrictions on International Spread of the 2014 West African
Ebola Epidemic, 19 EUROSURVEILLANCE 1, 8 (2014) (providing mathematical modelling).
65
Carolyn L. McCarty et al., CDC, Response to Importation of a Case of Ebola Virus Disease--Ohio,
October 2014, 63 MMWR, at 1089-1090 (2014).
66
Joanna J. Regan et al., CDC, Public Health Response to Commercial Airline Travel of a Person with
Ebola Virus Infection - United States, 2014, 64 MMWR 65 (2015).
67
See generally GALLUP, supra note 11 (providing data on Americans’ feelings about flying).
68
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AIRLINE PASSENGER TRAVEL, 3 OMNISTATS 1 (2003),
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/omnistats/volume_03_issue_03/pdf/entire
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8V4U-EMNW].
69
See Philip J. Smith et al., Parental Delay or Refusal of Vaccine Doses, Childhood Vaccination
Coverage at 24 Months of Age, and the Health Belief Model, 126 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 135, 140-41 (2011).
70
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 68, at 1 (finding that those who have never traveled in a
commercial airline are more likely to “have no more than a high school education” and “have a yearly
household income of less than $30,000”).
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which vaccines are targeted and the scope of any exemptions. These individuals will
face the vaccination mandate as a choice between either (a) not flying, or (b) becoming
vaccinated. Some portion of those individuals will find the prospect of life without
airline travel to be less attractive than the prospect of life fully vaccinated. The size of
this portion is an empirical question.
We can hypothesize that the number of individuals who become vaccinated due to
an airline mandate may be substantial, since the benefits of airline travel are so great.
In qualitative terms, airline travel allows both leisure (seventy-eight percent of all
trips) and business (twenty-two percent of all trips).71 The leisure category involves
visits with family, cultural traditions such as Thanksgiving, and celebrations such as
weddings. Because only thirty-seven percent of Americans still live in their
hometowns, there is an imperative to travel back to visit family and friends and to
participate in important life events.72 The leisure category also includes cultural
attractions, such as museums and vacations to a wide range of destinations. For
example, twenty-one million Americans enjoy snow skiing or snowboarding every
year, and fifteen million Americans enjoy snorkeling, scuba, or sailing every year. 73 A
substantial portion of these individuals do not live near locations where those sports
are possible, and airline travel may be necessary to enjoy those activities. 74
The business category involves a wide range of opportunities, including sales,
promotions, professional development, and conferences. In 2015, estimates placed
American business travel at over 492 million trips.75 For some jobs, a refusal to use
airline travel may be deeply problematic to career advancement or even retention.
Another way to measure value is by assessing the amount that individuals spend
on airline travel. In 2011, Americans spent on average $342 per person on airfare. 76
Basic economic theory suggests that the airline travel was worth at least that much to
these individuals, or else they would have been unwilling to spend it (preferring
instead to keep the money).77 In this sense, $342 per year represents the minimum
value of flying, and therefore is a decent floor for our estimate of the incentive effects
of an airline vaccine mandate. Of course, the airfare was likely only a means to an
end—one part of a vacation plan that may cost a few thousand dollars. For destinations
where driving is infeasible, the actual value of the flight may be much greater than its
airline fare.
71
U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, U.S. Travel Answer Sheet (2015), http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/
files/Media%20Root/Document/US_Travel_AnswerSheet_Jan2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/VMH4-ZZP9].
72
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PUT? WHERE’S HOME? 1 (2008), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/Movers-and-Stayers.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E7C7-TKJG] (last updated Dec. 29, 2008).
73
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(2013),
http://www.outdoorfoundation.org/pdf/ResearchParticipation2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/U9HY-A95F]. Note
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enjoy more than one sport. See id.
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See id. at 20 (providing data on the percentage of Americans who travel to take part in sports or
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2015), http://www.gbta.org/PressReleases/Pages/RLS_041515_USA.aspx [http://perma.cc/FD7T-UN7R].
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Geoffrey Paulin, Travel Expenditures: 2005-2011: Spending Slows During Recent Recession, 1 U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. 1, 2 (2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-1/pdf/travel-expenditures2005-2011-spending-slows-during-recent-recession.pdf [http://perma.cc/9RQN-83YA].
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See generally E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY (2002),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html
[http://perma.cc/HM6R-7NH4]
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Of course, individuals facing a vaccine mandate will weigh it against the out-ofpocket costs involved with purchasing the vaccine and any hassle involved in doing so.
For individuals who have health insurance subject to the essential health provisions of
the Affordable Care Act, vaccines are covered without cost-sharing.78 Still, some
individuals will lack such coverage and find the costs prohibitive, even though they
could otherwise afford to fly. This raises larger questions of health policy: is it rational
to have a healthcare system where costs deter some individuals from securing
vaccinations that provide a collective benefit to the population? At least in times of an
outbreak, it would be sensible for the government to fund the vaccination out of
general tax revenues.
The similar context of vaccine mandates in healthcare workplaces provides
analogical evidence as to the behavior of people subject to a mandate. In a systematic
review of twelve prior studies concerning such employer mandates, scholars found that
six of the studies documented terminations and voluntary resignations of 0.02-0.15%
of the workforce.79 Other studies found between three to four percent.80 Against these
losses of workers, the mandates showed significant increases in vaccinations, often in
the double digits, with all hospitals achieving greater than ninety-four percent rates of
vaccination among workers covered by the mandate. 81 Whether these mandates alone
are effective in reducing the spread of disease is another question. 82
Similarly, there is anecdotal evidence from physicians who have required that
their patients choose between vaccination and finding another doctor. The
phenomenon is surprisingly common—in one study of Connecticut doctors, thirty
percent fired patients for vaccine refusal. 83 One doctor reports that upon instituting the
discharge policy, approximately fifty to one hundred patients agreed to be vaccinated
who otherwise would not have.84 Nonetheless the research on this phenomenon is
surprisingly sparse; it should be a priority for future study.
Overall then, an unvaccinated, non-exempt person facing an airline vaccination
mandate will have to heavily weigh the costs of being non-vaccinated, including both
the increased risk of disease and the inability to travel by air. Future survey research
could provide more precise estimates as to the scale of the effect that an airline
vaccination policy may have on overall vaccination rates, and thus the effect on public
78
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., The Affordable Care Act and Immunization (Sept. 14,
2010), http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/fact-sheets/aca-and-immunization/index.html
[http://perma.cc/QGQ4-PVEL].
79
Samantha I. Pitts et al., A Systematic Review of Mandatory Influenza Vaccination in Healthcare
Personnel, 47 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 330, 336 (2014), http://vaccinesafetyresource.elsevier.com/
sites/default/files/Flu-Pitts-Systematic.pdf [http://perma.cc/89RF-SGLQ].
80
Id.
81
Id. at 332.
82
See Roger E. Thomas et al., Influenza Vaccination for Healthcare Workers Who Care for People
Aged 60 or Older Living in Long-Term Care Institutions, COCHRANE LIBRARY 1, 2 (2013) (“Vaccinating
healthcare workers who care for those aged 60 or over in LTCIs showed no effect on laboratory-proven influenza or
complications (lower respiratory tract infection, hospitalisation or death due to lower respiratory tract illness) in those
aged 60 or over resident in LTCIs .”); Eli Perencevich, Mandatory Influenza Vaccination of Healthcare Workers: The
End or Just the Beginning?, CONTROVERSIES IN HOSPITAL INFECTION PREVENTION (Dec. 18, 2015, 8:32 AM),
http://haicontroversies.blogspot.com/2015/12/mandatory-influenza-vaccination-of.html
[http://perma.cc/8NPKFZE9] (calling for additional sick leave and other policies to accompany a vaccine mandate).
83
Susan Leib et al., Pediatricians’ Experience with and Response to Parental Vaccine Safety Concerns
and Vaccine Refusals: A Survey of Connecticut Pediatricians, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 13, 17 (2011); see
also Shirley S. Wang, More Doctors 'Fire' Vaccine Refusers, WALL STREET J., Feb. 15, 2012, at A3
(discussing another study of Midwestern doctors, 21% of whom had discharged patients for vaccine refusal).
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Brittny Mejia, Doctors Turn Away Unvaccinated Kids, L.A. TIMES, Feb 10, 2015, at A1-A6,
http://www.latimes.com/science/la-me-vaccination-policy-20150210-story.html [http://perma.cc/JF6S8328].
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health more generally. However, it is plausible that a vaccine screen focused on airline
travel would increase the levels of vaccination and thus have a salutary effect on the
control of infectious disease.
III. THE EXISTING IMPETUS FOR AIRLINES TO ADOPT A VACCINE
SCREEN
This Part examines whether reasons already exist for airlines to adopt a
vaccination mandate policy. It considers market-based and liability-based reasons.
A. MARKET-BASED REASONS AND LOGISTICS
Before examining the need for government intervention, it is worthwhile to
consider whether the airlines, as rational profit-seeking enterprises, may have marketbased incentives to adopt some sort of vaccination policy. From the outset, it must be
acknowledged that this is an odd inquiry: how could it possibly be in the airline
industry’s interest to refuse some paying passengers?
Airlines are very sensitive to any suggestion that airline travel may be unsafe, and
infectious disease poses precisely such a threat to safety. During the Ebola outbreak in
2014, for example, airline stock prices tumbled, destroying billions of dollars of
company value based on fears that passengers would stay away from airline travel if
the outbreak were uncontrolled.85 Between September 2 and October 15, the airline
index lost sixteen percent of its value, more than double the losses of the S&P 500
during the same period; American Airlines alone lost more than a quarter of its
company value.86 Similarly, during the SARS outbreak of 2003, North American
airlines lost over one billion dollars in revenue due to reduced passenger traffic. 87
Scholarly surveys add weight to these concerns: over three-quarters of respondents say
that they would avoid public transportation during a pandemic. 88
As a strategy of managing a specific disease outbreak for which there is a vaccine
available, it is plausible to imagine an airline requiring passengers to be vaccinated in
order to reassure the other passengers that it is safe to fly. It is more difficult to assess
whether airlines may have an interest in doing so for more routine infectious diseases,
like measles or varicella, outside the context of a crisis. As noted above, however,
there may still be an incentive to avoid negative publicity about airline travel being
unhealthy, which appears in the mass media on a regular basis. 89
So far, we have focused on the potential for infectious disease to reduce air travel
generally, but it is also possible for particular airlines to distinguish themselves from
their competitors by adopting a vaccine policy. Such airlines could thereby brand
themselves as the cleaner, safer airline for passengers that prefer to fly with others who
85
Jeffrey Dastin, U.S. Airline Stocks Fall on Renewed Fears of Ebola Effect on Travel, REUTERS (Oct.
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are similarly vaccinated. Of course, airlines also share airline terminals and security
screening lines, which prevents them from making a strong claim about relative
infectious disease safety.
Of concern for airlines will be the logistics of enforcing any vaccine policy, as
well as who will bear those costs. After the September 11 attacks, Congress created a
$2.50 per leg of trip security fee, which paid for the enhanced screening; previously,
the airlines bore most of these costs themselves. 90 Similarly, the cost of screening
could be spread to passengers, and could be performed collectively for all airlines.
Alternatively, it could be borne by taxpayers as a whole or by the airlines themselves.
For a vaccine screen, these burdens could be minor or quite significant, depending
on the modality used for checking vaccination status and the scope of any such screen,
whether applied to a particular, highly salient vaccination (e.g., Ebola) or to a wide
range of vaccinations (some of which a passenger may have only received decades
ago). The move towards electronic medical records could facilitate this sharing of
information about vaccine status, especially if the federal government specifies a
particular standard for data sharing, which otherwise also protects patient privacy. If
airlines cooperated together to create such a standard, or if the federal government
actually did so, then an economy of scale could be achieved. Alternatively, for a
particular, highly salient vaccine (e.g., Ebola or seasonal flu), providers could issue a
card or electronic token that recipients could display at check-in.
Another modality would be to simply provide the vaccination at the airport itself,
as some airports already do for the annual seasonal flu shot. 91 While such a practice is
maximally efficient to reach all flyers at the point of service, the vaccine typically will
not be immediately effective. 92 Nonetheless, it would be valuable as a rollout for the
many flyers that travel repeatedly.
The least onerous method would be simply to require passengers to attest, under
penalty of perjury, that they have received whatever vaccines the airline wishes to
screen, perhaps supported by random audits (similar to tax enforcement). There will,
of course, be a trade-off between how rigorous any protocol will be to ensure its
accuracy, and the costs and burdens of having that level of screening. Herd immunity
does not require 100% attainment, which suggests that a low-hanging fruit strategy
may be optimal, at least initially.
A vaccine screen may also have a different impact on domestic travelers, the vast
majority of whom may already have a particular vaccine, as opposed to the millions of
international travelers annually, who may have much lower base rates of vaccination. 93
Currently, American immigration law requires vaccinations for those applying for
permanent residency status, but does not require vaccinations for temporary travel to
90
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the United States.94 Foreign travelers may also have difficulty showing compliance
with such a mandate if their healthcare providers do not speak English. Still, the World
Health Organization (“WHO”) already plays a role in facilitating the communication
of such health information across borders.95 The U.S. State Department could also
integrate such a mandate in its visa issuance and passport review procedures. Given
that the index patients may well come from abroad, the effectiveness of any airline
vaccine screen may depend on working out these logistics in particular.
Aside from those administrative costs and complications, the bottom line for a
rational airline is whether a vaccine mandate would ultimately increase or decrease the
number of seats filled. This empirical question in part depends on what proportion of
currently unvaccinated and non-exempt passengers would stop flying rather than
become vaccinated, and whether allayed fears of infectious disease would increase the
number of flights taken by others. On the other hand, it should be reassuring that the
vast majority of Americans do not object to vaccinations, 96 but more specific data
about the likely behavior of consumers under such an airline screen is currently
unavailable. If airlines do move towards a vaccine screen, they may do so collectively.
The airline industry suffers from market concentration, which makes competition
along this dimension less likely.97
B. LIABILITY-BASED REASONS
If the market fails to produce an optimal level of vaccinations, background
liability rules may do so. In particular, tort law imposes upon airlines a duty of care to
passengers as well as to others on the ground who are foreseeably injured by airline
operations.
To be sure, although the airlines are heavily regulated by the Federal Aviation
Administration, state tort law remedies have not been altogether preempted. However,
the courts are split as to whether federal law substitutes the common law standard of
care for a different, arguably lower, standard, which may be sufficient to incentivize
airlines to take precautions. We first review that common law standard, then consider
the federal standard, and the divided authority as to which one applies.

94
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1.

The Duty to Screen
Research does not reveal any case law directly on the point of airline liability for
infectious diseases. Under state tort laws generally, as a common carrier, airlines have
a duty of care to their passengers to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical
harm. Traditionally, common carriers were held to an exacting standard approaching
strict liability: “a duty of utmost care and diligence to their passengers.” 98 For
example, as one court explained, “whether it be termed 'the highest standard of care,'
'highest degree of vigilance, care and precaution for the safety of those it undertakes to
transport,' or 'the strictest diligence,’” airlines faced significant liability for their
passengers’ injuries.99 The modern trend is towards a reasonableness standard that
extends to risks that are peculiar or heightened by the special relationship of trust and
dependence, which exists between carrier and passenger.100 This special relationship
would make it difficult for an airline to claim “nonfeasance,” as if it had no duty to
protect one person from an infection caused by another.
Airlines also have duties to people on the ground. For example, an airline may be
held liable for damages if the plane crashes into a car on the ground. 101 In one case, the
Second Circuit held that an airline could be liable for failing to adequately screen
passengers against terrorists. 102 The September 11 case discussed below is perhaps the
most noteworthy such holding.
With regard to ill passengers in particular, airlines have themselves recognized
their prerogative and duty with regard to the spread of disease. Many airlines already
have a contract of carriage with a refusal to transport clause that specifies the airline’s
ability to prevent customers from flying if they have a contagious illness that may be
transmittable to other passengers.103
Under the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”), airline carriers also have specific duties
of care. The FAA enables the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
(an operating mode of the Department of Transportation) to prescribe “regulations and
minimum standards for [] practice, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds
necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.”104 When prescribing these
regulations, the Administrator must “consider . . . the duty of an air carrier to provide
98
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793, 794 (1960); see, e.g., Gaines v. Chicago Transit Auth., 804 N.E.2d 653, 656 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2004) (“It
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104
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service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.”105 The actual
duty of care proscribed by the regulations, however, seems to be lower, merely
prohibiting an airline from “operat[ing] an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so
as to endanger the life or property of another.” 106 Arguably, an airline could act
unreasonably even without being careless or reckless.
More particularly, section 44902(b) of the FAA provides that an air carrier has
discretion to “refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is, or
might be, inimical to safety.” 107 On the basis of this statutory authority, for example,
the FAA has promulgated regulations for the Secure Flight Program, a
counterterrorism watch list.108 Under a prior version of the statute, a state appellate
court interpreted section 44902(b) to also allow the airline to refuse passage to a sick
individual so as to not interfere with the airline’s duty to other passengers.109 But no
such case has dealt with the issue of an airline’s potential liability to injured
passengers for failure to refuse passage to a sick or unvaccinated individual. 110
It is clear that the plaintiff’s right to a private cause of action has not been
preempted by federal law. 111 The FAA’s “savings” clause provides that “[a] remedy
under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.” 112 Nonetheless,
authority is split on whether the federal standard of care preempts the state common
law standard of care.113 Moreover, the analysis depends on the particular theories of
breach asserted by plaintiffs.114
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After the September 11 attacks, Congress created a victim’s compensation fund,
which immunized the airlines from any claims by those who had taken such
compensation, but alternatively allowed non-claimants to recover from the airlines
under state tort law, subject to a damages cap equal to their insurance coverage. 115 The
resulting litigation is particularly instructive. The plaintiffs, consisting of classes of
passengers as well as individuals injured on the ground by the crashing planes, claimed
that the airlines were negligent in failing to screen passengers; they never should have
allowed passengers on board with box cutters.116 On motions for summary judgment,
the trial court considered whether the airlines had any duty at all to those on the
ground and whether the terrorist acts were within the scope of that duty. 117 The court
held that “the Aviation Defendants controlled who came onto the planes and what was
carried aboard. They had the obligation to take reasonable care in screening precisely
because of the risk of terrorist hijackings, and the dangerous consequences that would
inevitably follow.”118
On the preemption question, the court conceded that this was a domain where
there “has been a history of significant federal presence,” 119 and noted that courts had
“taken different positions on the scope of preemption in the aviation context.” 120 The
court dismissed any concern about preemption because the “[d]efendants ha[d] not
shown any inconsistency between the law of duty provided by New York law and
federal statutes or regulations.”121 Therefore, the state law claims were allowed to
proceed.122
The foregoing legal analysis suggests that, to the extent that the risk of spreading
contagious disease is foreseeable, airlines may face significant liability in at least some
of the federal circuits if they fail to act reasonably with regard to that risk. We leave to
the side a more specific analysis regarding what sorts of precautions would be required
under the circumstances as a fact-intensive question for a jury. But the specter of
liability seems real, at least so far.
2.

The Duty Not to Discriminate
In its grant of rulemaking authority to the FAA Administrator, while requiring the
“highest degree of safety” and, in particular allowing screening of passengers for
safety, Congress also required that rulemakers weigh “the public right of freedom of
transit through the navigable airspace.”123 There is no regulation that restricts the
Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that federal aviation employment policies
preempted state statute regulating drug testing for employees).
114
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Peterson v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 246, 250-51 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (refusing to extend
preemption to a claim that fell within the airline’s standard of conduct as a “service” under 49 U.S.C. §
41713 because there was a dispute about the reasonableness of the service provided).
115
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airlines’ ability to screen on vaccination status in particular, but there are a range of
policies related to discrimination on disease status, which could indirectly implicate
such a policy.
The regulations do prohibit an air carrier from discriminating against a passenger
with a disability, which includes those that have a communicable disease or infection
unless the air carrier “determine[s] that the passenger’s condition poses a direct
threat.”124 The airline may assess the condition of a “direct threat” by relying on
“directives issued by public health authorities (e.g., the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control or Public Health Service; comparable agencies in other countries; the World
Health Organization)” and by “consider[ing] the significance of the consequences of a
communicable disease and the degree to which it can be readily transmitted by casual
contact in an aircraft cabin environment.”125 The regulation provides examples of
direct versus non-direct threats such as the common cold, which is highly transmissible
but lacks severe health consequences; thus, it does not pose a direct threat. 126 This is in
comparison to SARS, which is highly transmissible and has severe consequences, thus
posing a direct threat to other passengers. 127
Applying these principles, in Adamsons v. American Airlines, Inc., the Court of
Appeals of New York held that an airline permissibly refused passage to an individual
in extreme pain due to an undiagnosed, mysterious illness.128 There, the passenger was
stricken with an illness while visiting Haiti, and the illness left her in a wheelchair with
a catheter.129 While boarding the plane from her ambulance, she cried out in pain and
the airline decided that the plaintiff's health, as well as the safety of the other
passengers, would be jeopardized if she was allowed to travel on that flight. 130 Reading
§ 44902, the court found that Congress “makes it abundantly clear that the decision to
accept or refuse a passenger for air carriage lies exclusively with the airline.” 131 Based
upon considerations of safety and problems inherent to air travel, as long as the airline
exercised discretion in good faith and for rational reasons, the decision must be
accepted.132
On the other hand, airlines must transport a passenger with a communicable
disease or infection if he or she presents a medical certificate, ensuring that the
infection is not communicable to other persons during the flight or describing
conditions or precautions that would prevent transmission, and if the airline can
feasibly carry out such measures.133 But, even with a medical certificate, the carrier
maintains the discretion to require the passenger to undergo additional medical review
by the airline itself if the certificate “significantly understates the passenger’s risk to
the health of other persons on the flight.” 134 The agency’s response to public comments
under the final rule as promulgated clarifies that the “additional review would have to
be conducted by medical personnel (e.g., members of the carrier's medical staff or
medical personnel to whom the carrier referred the passenger)” and does not give
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unbridled discretion to “staff to disregard medical certificates presented by passengers
from their own physicians.”135
Formally, these provisions are irrelevant to a screen based on vaccination status,
since a passenger’s decision not to vaccinate is not itself a disability.136 Of course,
some individuals could successfully claim that they have a medical condition, such as
a compromised immune system, which is a disability. 137 If the disability prevents the
passenger from safely receiving the vaccine, then the airline’s screen could be
discriminatory.138 So, unless the unvaccinated individual poses a “direct threat,”
current law likely requires that any vaccine policy include such medical exemptions.
Indeed, the fact that some passengers will remain unvaccinated for bona fide reasons
increases the importance of getting everyone else vaccinated.
More generally, however, it would be odd for a regulation to allow screening of a
passenger because she is not vaccinated against a given disease, but disallow the
airline to screen passengers that are actually infected with that same disease but
present a medical certificate. One could argue for such a generally applicable policy,
however, as being consistent with the spirit of the regulations, which discourage
airlines from discriminating on the basis of actual disease status, which may also be a
legally protected disability. Screening of vaccination status may better protect fellow
passengers, since the risk of contagion may exist even when symptoms are not yet
manifested at a level noticeable by airline personnel.
The airlines are also prohibited from discriminating against passengers on the
basis of religion.139 An exceedingly small number of Americans are members of
religions that actually prohibit vaccinations, but in some contexts, “religion” has been
interpreted very broadly. 140 Whether a generally applicable vaccine mandate by a
private party (i.e., the airline) burdens religion is another question. 141 As the Supreme
135
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 73 Fed. Reg. 27614-01 (May 13, 2008)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
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HEALTH MATRIX: J. L. MED. (Feb. 8, 2015), UC Hastings Research Paper No. 136.
137
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 compel all of its employees to take the influenza vaccine regardless
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an exemption from a mandatory vaccination requirement based on an ADA disability that prevents him from
taking the influenza vaccine. This would be a reasonable accommodation barring undue hardship
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139
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U.S. carriers provide safe and adequate transportation. Finally, 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2012) prohibits unfair
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Court said in Prince v. Massachusetts, “the right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the
latter to ill health or death.”142 If necessary, airlines could offer religious exemptions,
but the scope and applicability of those exemptions would need to be resolved in a way
that does not undermine the effectiveness of the vaccine screen. 143 For present
purposes of considering the airlines’ liability for failing to screen unvaccinated
passengers, discrimination law presents no barrier.
3.

Other Elements for Liability
The foregoing has made it clear that, with regard to communicable diseases,
airlines do have a duty to passengers and others on the ground, regardless of whether
that standard is given by state law or federal law. Beyond duty, for civil liability to
apply, an injured person must also show: (1) a breach of that duty; (2) that the breach
was the proximate cause of the injury; and, (3) damages.144 Of these, breach and
causation are most interesting.
With regard to the failure of an airline to screen on vaccination status, a plaintiff
would have to show that screening was reasonable under the circumstances, which is
to say that the airline knew, or should have known, about the risk of exposing
passengers to unvaccinated fellow passengers.145 This element would be easier to
prove during a particular contagious disease outbreak. In weighing breach, the court
could consider the relative costs, such as administrative burdens, against the benefits
of such precautions, such as the proven effectiveness of any particular vaccine at
issue.146
Airlines know, or should know, that simply screening passengers who are
obviously very sick, or who self-disclose their sickness, is not sufficient to exclude
those carrying communicable diseases. On the other hand, some older case law
continues to be cited for the proposition that “to hold an individual negligent for
transmitting an infectious disease, ‘it must be proved that the defendant knew of the

protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”). For a more recent application of this doctrine,
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presence of the disease.’”147 On this doctrine, mere knowledge of the increased risk
due to a passenger being unvaccinated would not suffice.
Furthermore, the fact that airlines are not presently screening on this basis would
be relevant as an industry standard, although it would be considered by the factfinder
as mere evidence of non-breach since the standard of care is objective.148 Airlines
could also benefit from the fact that leading texts on infectious disease and air travel
have not recommended, or even focused upon, vaccination (until now). 149 The airlines’
discretionary authority to exclude passengers provides a double-edged sword, which
courts may read to either reiterate the airlines’ responsibility in this regard, or to give
deference to an airline if it does so in good faith, as in Adamsons discussed above.150
The causation requirement would also be challenging for a plaintiff, who would
have to show that the airline’s failure to screen was a but-for cause, or a substantial
factor, in causing the plaintiff’s own infection. Case law provides no direct guidance
here.
Cases involving illnesses on cruise ships are instructive, although research has
failed to uncover cases focusing on failure to screen unvaccinated cruisers.
Nonetheless, in Pettit v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., the District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that, even if the cruise ship failed to sanitize passenger
cabins, plaintiffs did not prove causation for upper respiratory tract infections
(“URTI”) when only 3.3% of 1934 passengers visited the ship's infirmary with cold or
URTI symptoms.151 The passengers’ close contact with each other before and during
the cruise, both within and outside the cruise ship, also confounded the causation
analysis.152 Similarly in another case, a cruise passenger alleged that she had acquired
meningitis, bacteremia, and osteomyelitis from a cruise where the ship operator failed
to screen crewmembers and properly filter the air. 153 Her case was dismissed for
failing to plead causation in a way sufficient to satisfy Iqbal and Twombly, which the
court suggested would have, at the very least, required specific pleadings on
information and belief that that other passengers or crewmembers were infected with
the same diseases.154
Accordingly, it will be challenging for an airline passenger to show causation
unless she has both a molecular diagnosis of her own sickness and some evidence
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showing transmission or circulation by the airline. The situation may be different when
a major outbreak affects a large portion of passengers. 155
At least for fairly exotic diseases like SARS and Ebola, public health authorities
and researchers routinely identify the specific infected passengers, specify their seats
on the airlines, and then trace other passengers who were proximate to them, often
using genomic analyses to distinguish particular strains of the disease. 156 Nonetheless,
the literature in this domain is more suggestive than conclusive, depending on
retrospective analyses, rather than anything like the gold-standard of randomized
trials.157 Still, a factfinder could find causation under the preponderance of the
evidence standard (i.e., more likely than not) for a plaintiff who can identify the
particular patient who was allowed to board her same flight and then show both her
own proximity to that patient and her subsequent, timely contraction of the disease
with the same genetic profile.
Overall, it seems that the airline industry has some prudential market-based
reasons to seriously consider screening passengers for vaccination status, at least when
a potential outbreak is imminent or happening. If a passenger, or person on the ground,
is injured due to the airline’s failure to screen, then state laws, even if applying federal
standards, do provide some bases for holding airlines liable. Still the case for liability
would be far from clear, and thus likely insufficient to cause airlines to fully
internalize the costs of reasonable precautions to reduce the risk of spreading infection.
IV. A FEDERAL MANDATE FOR AIRLINE PASSENGERS TO BE
VACCINATED
A. NEW FEDERAL RULES UNDER EXISTING STATUTES
As shown above, Congress has authorized the Federal Aviation Administration to
prescribe “regulations and minimum standards for [] practice, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.”158
As of yet, no regulation has addressed the issue of passenger vaccination status. But
under general statutory authority, both the FAA and the Department of Health and
Human Services may have sufficient authority to impose an airline passenger
vaccination mandate. Even under current statutes, there are several mechanisms for
doing so.
One attractive route would be for federal agencies to provide non-binding
guidance for airlines, which advises them on how they should exercise their nowexisting rights to refuse to transport a passenger they deem may be “inimical to
safety.”159 Similarly, under the ACAA, an airline may refuse to board a passenger,
who presents a medical certificate from her own doctor attesting that she is not a
danger to other passengers, if the airline nonetheless finds that the condition poses a
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“direct threat.”160 Arguably, the Federal Aviation Administration could issue
administrative guidelines and interpretive rules setting forth acceptable discretionary
actions an airline could take in denying passage to unvaccinated individuals. This
mode of regulation is familiar to health law scholars, most notably because it is a
primary mechanism used by the Food and Drug Administration.161
This mechanism of regulation would not require the robust procedures for notice
and comment, and would largely avoid judicial oversight. In Association of Flight
Attendants v. Huerta, the court held that the FAA’s notice concerning use and stowage
of portable electronic devices aboard commercial and other aircraft was not a “final
agency action” subject to judicial review on petition by a union representing flight
attendants.162 Because the notice did not impermissibly and substantially alter or
effectively amend the regulation that pertained to carry-on baggage on an aircraft, it
did not violate the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act.163 Thus, the court reasoned that the challenged notice was not a legislative rule
carrying the force and effect of law because the guidance offered therein reflected
nothing more than a statement of agency policy or interpretive rule, and notice was not
contrary to existing regulations.164
Here, the FAA could follow the justifications stated in Association of Flight
Attendants and issue a notice in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) and 14 C.F.R. §
382.21(b) providing guidance as a statement of agency policy to require passenger
vaccination.165 Just as current guidance outlines the parameters for a highly contagious
and serious disease, like SARS, to be properly considered a “direct threat,” the agency
could expand upon this type of example to include situations where passengers are
unvaccinated for communicable diseases, which are then prevalent and dangerous. 166
By articulating specific directives for or against the screening of passengers on
vaccination status, federal guidance could also effectively create a safe harbor for
airlines against potential passenger-plaintiffs who either become infected by an
unvaccinated passenger or complain of discrimination. An agency interpretation
extending the “direct threat” language to individuals without proof of vaccination
would facilitate plaintiffs’ negligence claims for airlines that failed to comply, even if
the interpretation was non-binding. Such an interpretation could support potential
negligence claims that: (1) the airline failed to foresee risks of a dangerous condition;
(2) it failed to protect against it; or (3) the airline’s lack of a vaccination mandate was
the proximate cause of a passenger’s contracted illness. One feature of such an
approach is that it may lead to airlines performing vaccine screening, without the
judicial scrutiny that comes with state action.167
Federal agencies could also undertake formal rulemaking. Interestingly, federal
law imposes a particular sort of cost-constraint on FAA regulations, requiring the
Secretary of Transportation to consent to those regulations likely to impose $250
160
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million or more on the industry or broader economy. 168 It bears emphasis that
Congress has also required that the FAA’s rules weigh “the public right of freedom of
transit through the navigable airspace.”169
The Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) and the CDC are other
potential rulemakers with existing statutory authority. The TSA coordinates with the
FAA on aviation safety, including establishing protocols for notifying the FAA of
suspected threats to airline or passenger safety. 170 It has established, in partnership
with the CDC, a public health Do Not Board (“DNB”) list, which restricts certain
individuals who meet specific criteria from boarding commercial aircraft with
communicable diseases.171 Vaccination status could be similarly considered.
Under the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) is authorized to take measures to prevent the entry and spread of
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States and between
states.172 The authority for carrying out these functions has been delegated to the
Surgeon General and the CDC.173 Their rulemaking authority is remarkably broad in
the domain of communicable disease. As the authorizing statute provides:
[T]he Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized
to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to
prevent the spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into
the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other
State or possession. For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such
regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such . . . measures, as
in his judgment may be necessary. 174
Overall, it is clear that federal agencies already have broad authority to require
vaccinations as a condition of airline travel. Whether, in any given case, such an
exercise of authority would be reasonable is an open question.
B. A NEW STATUTORY MANDATE
If airlines themselves do not begin vaccination screening, or if federal agencies do
not exercise current authority to compel them to, then Congress could exercise its
authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause to impose vaccination screening on a
national basis.
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had the
power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to require
that individuals purchase health insurance, and answered the question in the
negative.175 The Court “read carefully” these clauses “to avoid creating a general
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federal authority akin to the [states’] police power.” 176 The Court reiterated that, “our
precedents read that to mean that Congress may regulate ‘the channels of interstate
commerce,’ ‘persons or things in interstate commerce,’ and ‘those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.’” 177 For the individual mandate, the
government’s theory was that “Congress may order individuals to buy health insurance
because the failure to do so affects interstate commerce and could undercut the
Affordable Care Act's other reforms.” 178 The Court struck down the “individual
mandate [because] it does not regulate existing commercial activity,” but instead
required individuals to purchase a product—health insurance.179 The Court redeemed
the mandate, nonetheless, under the taxing power of the federal government.
A mandate for airlines to screen passengers for vaccine status has none of these
constitutional infirmities, and thus need not be framed as a tax. The proposed mandate
is itself predicated on commercial activity: the purchase of an airline ticket. It applies
only to “those who by some preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of
federal regulation.”180 And furthermore, it regulates channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce—the airlines, airplanes, and their passengers.181 Such a screening
mandate would thus receive constitutional authority regardless of whether any
particular flight crosses state borders.182 Finally, if a vaccine reassures the travelling
public and supports the many industries and consumers that depend on a stable airline
industry, it also affects interstate commerce in a way that is much more direct than the
insurance mandate did.183 The federal government already imposes an intrusive
security search on all travelers, and nobody supposes it is beyond the Commerce
Clause power.184 There can be little doubt that Congress has constitutional authority to
regulate in favor of an airline vaccine screen.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Commerce Clause includes a
power to regulate the spread of disease, by means including prohibiting travel in
interstate commerce.185 Specifically, the federal quarantine and isolation power rests
on the authority of the Commerce Clause. 186 In 1886, the Supreme Court recognized
that Congress would have the power to undertake a “general system of quarantine,”
176
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which would have the effect of abrogating all state laws on the subject “so far as the
two are inconsistent.”187 Since 1944, the federal government has enjoyed this
quarantine power, for a list of diseases specified by the President’s executive orders. 188
In one case, for example, a district court dismissed a habeas petition filed on behalf of
an airline passenger who was ordered to isolation in the United States after returning
from Stockholm, Sweden, which was then suffering from a smallpox outbreak. 189 The
traveler was held in isolation during the incubation period for the disease because she
failed to produce a certificate proving vaccination. 190
An airline travel vaccine mandate could theoretically impinge the right to travel
(“RTT”), a concept found in the penumbras of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
has explained that:
[T]he ‘right to travel’ . . . protects the right of a citizen of one State to
enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the
second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.191
Accordingly, most of the RTT cases have involved state restrictions, which tended to
undermine the unity of the national government and the equality of citizens hailing
from different states.192 The proposed vaccine screen for airline travel does not tread
on the interests actually protected by this right. Moreover, the hypothetical mandate
for vaccine screening restricts interstate travel, but only in one particular mode of
transportation; individuals are still free to travel by other means. 193 Ultimately, it
would be anomalous to suppose that this unenumerated right somehow constrains the
power of the federal government to exercise its enumerated power to regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Finally, the Supreme Court has
held that the right to travel only protects against “unreasonable” burdens. 194 The RTT
is no obstacle to an airline screen.
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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), however, may be more of an
impediment to such a mandate.195 This statute applies greater scrutiny than the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine when applied to laws of general
applicability that only incidentally burden religion.196 RFRA applies when a federal
law “substantially” burdens a person’s exercise of religion, even if the law is neutral
and generally applicable, such as a vaccine mandate keyed to airline travel. 197 In
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Supreme Court held that the Affordable Care
Act’s contraceptives mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion for forprofit corporations, and that the contraceptives mandate did not satisfy RFRA’s leastrestrictive means requirement.198 The court specifically distinguished future cases that
may involve vaccinations, and no subsequent case has applied Burwell to strike down
a vaccination mandate.199 Nonetheless, the ruling casts a shadow over all public health
regulation, given that virtually any objector can cloak their objection in religious
garb.200
If RFRA were interpreted to impinge on a vaccination mandate, the government
or the airlines could offer exemptions. If these were applied broadly, however, the
vaccine screen may have little marginal benefit for public health over existing
incentives for vaccination. Instead, any such exemption should be narrow and onerous,
in order to minimize the number of flyers who successful opt-out.201 Under RFRA, no
such exemption would be necessary if the vaccine mandate were understood to serve a
compelling government interest and were also the least restrictive means of serving
that interest.202 The vaccine mandate arguably fits that bill. Finally, it is important

to remember that RFRA is simply a statute, which Congress could overturn at
any time.
International law also limits federal prerogatives in this domain. In 2005, the
United States joined the International Health Regulations, (“IHR”) a WHO program,
which, among other things, endeavors to develop public health interventions at airports
to prevent the spread of infectious disease and to minimize disruptions in international
trade by “limiting unnecessary health based restrictions on international traffic and
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trade.”203 The primary thrust of IHR focuses on the former goal, building state
capacities and coordination of information and efforts to fight infectious disease. 204
The IHR does, however, also limit states from overreacting to an infectious disease
outbreak, and instead purports to limit states from unilaterally imposing travel
restrictions. 205
The IHR is unlikely to present a real impediment to an airline vaccine screen. The
United States already requires fourteen vaccinations for United States immigration. 206
And, the WHO already recommends the most common vaccines, especially for
travelers.207 Thus it is not clear that there would be any conflict in an American policy
mandate that applied a vaccine screen to airline travel, e.g., any flight operated by a
United States carrier, or landing or departing from a United States airport.
Even if there were a conflict with the IHR, it would not be debilitating to such a
policy. During the Ebola outbreak, for example, Canada stopped issuing visas to
residents and nationals of Ebola-affected countries.208 The WHO invoked the IHR to
demand an official explanation from Canada. 209 When Canada clarified that its travel
ban did not prohibit travel by Canadians themselves or to others already holding visas,
it appeared to placate the WHO.210 Similarly, it is not clear that the WHO would
oppose a vaccination screen as a targeted method to reduce the spread of infectious
disease, since it is not an outright ban on travel to or from and infected country.
Regardless, even if the WHO saw an American vaccine screen as non-compliant, it is
clear that the IHR has no sanctioning mechanism.211 Over the longer term, a conflict
with the United States could erode the global consensus on the IHR, but it presents no
practical impediment to implementation of a reasonable vaccine screen policy by the
United States federal government.
V. CONCLUSION
Scholars and policymakers have overlooked the potential to screen airline
passengers for vaccine status as an important public health tool that can reduce the
spread of disease between the millions of people that fly on airplanes each year. Such a
policy could also reduce the distribution of disease inter-regionally, and potentially
create an incentive for vaccination that creates positive spillovers. Although airlines
already have some market-based and liability-based reasons to adopt such a vaccine
screening policy, these may be insufficient. Federal rulemakers have authority to
203
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require airlines to adopt such a policy, but if Congress chose to enact a new statute for
this purpose, it would also enjoy validity under the Constitution and international law.
Whether an airline vaccine screen is the optimal response to a particular
contagious disease will depend on the exercise of prudent judgment by scientists and
policymakers. A mandate could backfire, causing a backlash that reduces overall
vaccination rates.212 On the other hand, the failure to adopt a mandate could needlessly
expose millions of people to infection. The point of the present analysis is simply to
show that prudence and science should control; the law is no impediment.
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